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Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on
Trial
INTRODUCTION
On January 28, 1977, Joyce Bernice Hawthorne reported to po-
lice that she had shot her husband.' Hawthorne was arrested and
subsequently charged with and convicted of first degree murder.
The conviction was overturned on appeal.2
On retrial, the defense asserted that the defendant had shot her
husband in self-defense.3 In order to enable the jury to assess the
reasonableness of Hawthorne's belief that her life was in danger
when she shot her husband, the defense proffered the testimony of
an expert witness to testify about the battered woman syndrome.4
The testimony was excluded and Hawthorne was subsequently
convicted of second degree murder.5 On appeal, this conviction
was reversed, 6 in part because the court determined that it was
error to exclude the testimony of the expert.7 On remand, a hear-
ing was held to determine whether the expert was qualified and
whether the subject matter of the battered woman syndrome was
sufficiently developed to support an expert opinion.8 As a result
of this hearing, the trial court ruled that the testimony was inad-
missible.9 Hawthorne was subsequently convicted of manslaugh-
ter. 0 This conviction is currently on appeal.'I
The history of the case of Joyce Bernice Hawthorne provides an
excellent example of the major issues with which the courts have
been struggling in determining the admissibility of expert testi-
mony on the subject of the battered woman syndrome. This Com-
ment will address two major issues. First, the problem the courts
1. Thomas, The Battered Woman-A Legal Defense, The Champion, May, 1982,
at 7.
2. Hawthorne v. State, 377 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
3. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
4. Id. at 805.
5. Id.
6. Id at 807.
7. Id.
8. State v. Hawthorne, No. 77-235-C (Fla. Cir. Ct., Escambia Cty. July 14,
1982), Order on Defendant's Suggestion of Admissibility of the Testimony of Lenore
Walker, Ed. D.) [hereinafter cited as Order] (copy on file in offices of California
Western Law Review).
9. Id.
10. Id
11. Hawthorne v. State, No. AN-435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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and attorneys have in conceptualizing the role of the battered wo-
man syndrome in a self-defense plea, and second, the determina-
tion of the admissibility of expert testimony relating to the
battered woman syndrome in light of the three prong test set forth
in Dyas v. United States12 and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Preceeding these discussions there will be a brief explanation of
the battered woman syndrome in order to assist the reader in bet-
ter understanding the discussions which follow. 13
I. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Several factors have been identified as being common to violent
relationships.' 4 The battered woman syndrome refers to the
unique psychological and behavioral reactions to these common
factors which are exhibited by a person who is living in a violent
relationship.' 5 These factors include the patterns of violence and
non violence which occur in a battering relationship, 16 as well as
the obstacles which make leaving the relationship difficult, if not
impossible. 17
4. Patterns in Abusive Relationshios
Research into the area of domestic violence has identified sev-
eral common patterns in abusive relationships.' 8 Among these
are: 1) the escalation of the abuse in frequency and severity over
time,19 2) the existence of a three phase cycle of violence,20 and 3)
12. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
13. Although the focus of this Comment is on women who are claiming self-
defense against a man with whom they had a violent relationship, it should be noted
that the battered woman syndrome has been used in other contexts; State v. Muth,
Crim Case No. 81-6744CF (Broward County Ct., Fla. 1982) (involving a son charged
with the murder of his father); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980) (the
battered woman syndrome was used by the state to refute the insanity defense of a
man on trial for the attempted murder of his wife).
14. Address by Angela Browne, The Battered Women Syndrome, The Sepf-De.
fense Plea, and the Role of the District Attorney, Kansas County & District Attorneys
Association Annual Meeting, at 7 (July 29, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Browne] (copy
on file in offices of California Western Law Review).
15. See generally D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976) [hereinafter cited as
MARTIN]; M. STRAUS, R. GELLES, & S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS - VIO-
LENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980) [hereinafter cited as STRAUS]; L. WALKER,
FINAL REPORT, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME STUDY (NIMH 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BWSS] (copy on file in offices of California Western Law Review); L.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter cited as WALKER].
16. Browne, supra note 14; see also supra note 15.
17. Browne, supra note 14.
18. Id
19. BWSS, supra note 15, at 145.
20. Id at 113; WALKER, supra note 15, at 55.
[Vol. 20
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the jealousy of the batterer.21
One of the most consistent research findings is that the violence
in a relationship escalates in both frequency and severity over
time.22 The violence in the relationship usually begins as a minor
incident, perhaps a slap or a shove. 23 Because this first incident is
a surprise to both parties, excuses are made for the violence. The
battering is blamed on drinking,24 job and family pressures, or
money worries.2 5 Apologies are given, such as, "It will never hap-
pen again" or "I do not know what happened. '2 6 However, in
most battering relationships the violence does continue with both
the frequency and severity of the abuse, escalating to where it is
often life threatening.2 7
A second pattern which has been identified is that the violence
frequently occurs within the context of a three phase cycle.28
First, there is the tension building phase.29 During this time there
is a gradual escalation of friction, anger expressed by the batterer,
name-calling, and/or physical abuse.30 Eventually this tension
explodes into an acute battering phase.31 At this stage, the bat-
terer may appear to lose control.32 The abuse which is inflicted
may consist of slaps and punches which result in bruises and black
eyes, to an extreme of prolonged beatings which last for hours or
days, during which time the woman may be close to death.33 Psy-
chological abuse, such as threats of further harm or death,34 as
well as sexual abuse, may be a part of the acute battering phase.35
Following this period of violence, there is a period of loving
contrition36 during which the batterer may apologize, try to give
some medical attention, or show remorse and kindness and make
21. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 58. BWSS, supra note 15, at 146; WALKER, supra
note 15, at 73.
22. BWSS, supra note 15, at 145.
23. Id. at 148.
24. Id at 81.
25. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 54.
26. BWSS, supra note 15, at 114.
27. WALKER, supra note 15, at 105.
28. BWSS, supra note 15, at 113; WALKER, supra note 15, at 55.
29. WALKER, supra note 15, at 57.
30. Id.
31. WALKER, supra note 15, at 59.
32. Id.
33. WALKER, supra note 15, at 59-65.
34. Id. at 62.
35. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 66-69; WALKER supra note 15, at 107-26; Address
by Roberta Thyfault, Childhood Sexual Abuse, Marital Rape, and Battered Women:
Implications for Mental Health Workers, Colorado Mental Health Conference, Key-
stone, Colorado (Oct. 24, 1980); Address by Roberta Thyfault, SexualAbuse in the
Battering Relationshp, Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, Tucson, Arizona
(Apr. 11, 1980) (copy on file in the offices of California Western Law Review).
36. WALKER, supra note 15, at 65-70.
1984]
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promises that he will never hurt the woman again. 37 He may stop
drinking for a period of time or attend a few sessions of counsel-
ing in an attempt to show that he loves the woman and wants to
change. At this time, the woman wants to believe that he will
change.38 This period of loving contrition can vary in length, al-
though it appears to decrease the longer the relationship lasts.39
Even if there is no period of loving contrition, the time following
the acute phase will be marked by a cessation of violence and a
period of calm.40 Eventually, however, the cycle will begin once
again.4t
A third pattern which is common to violent relationships is that
a batterer is often extremely jealous of any time or attention the
woman may show to her family, friends, or co-workers.42 He may
frequently accuse her of being involved with other men.43 In ad-
dition, he may not allow her to see her family or friends unless he
is with her, or in some cases, he may not allow her to see them at
all.44 Because of this jealousy, the woman may isolate herself
from family and friends in an attempt to keep him happy.45 This
isolation only serves to increase his control over her and to make
it more difficult for her to escape.46
B. Obstacles to Leaving
Even if the woman wants to leave the relationship, this is not
the easy task that is presumed by the question, "Why doesn't she
just leave?" The woman may have no place to go. The battered
woman shelter may be full or unable to accommodate her chil-
dren or she may only be able to stay for a few days or weeks, at
which time, if she does not have an alternative place to live, she
may have to return home.47 Even if she is working, the woman
may not have the economic resources to support herself and her
children. She may be ineligible for welfare benefits unless she ob-
37. Id
38. Id.
39. BWSS, supra note 15, at 115.
40. Id at 114.
41. WALKER, supra note 15, at 69.
42. See supra note 21.
43. BWSS, supra note 15, at 71.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. WALKER, supra note 15, at 172-74.
47. Browne, supra note 14, at 9; Del Martin writes: "One of the most telling
statistics regarding the number of battered women in this country is the fact that
whenever a shelter for battered women is established, whether it be in an urban or
rural area, it is filled to capacity immediately and there is a long waiting list." Mar-
tin, What Keeps a Woman Captive in a Violent Relationshp? The Social Context of
Battering, in BATrERED WOMEN, 33, 39 (D. Moore ed. 1979).
[Vol. 20
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tains a divorce from her husband.48 If she wishes to remain in
hiding, she may be unable to receive her divorce without her bat-
terer finding out where she is staying, since he may be granted
visitation rights to see the children. 49 Several other obstacles,
which are not as readily apparent also make it difficult to leave a
violent relationship. These include 1) fear,50 and 2) that many
battered women focus their energies on surviving on a day-to-day
basis, rather than planning how to escape from the relationship.5'
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to leaving the battering relation-
ship is fear.52 Even if a woman is able to overcome all the other
problems involved in leaving she may be too fearful to leave.53
The man may have threatened to harm her, their children, her
friends, or her family if she leaves.54 A common statement made
by the man is, "if I can't have you, no one will."55 Perhaps the
woman received a severe beating on a previous occasion when she
left him.5 6 It is often easier for the woman to stay in a situation
which is familiar to her, even though it is violent, than to leave
and constantly live in fear that the man will suddenly show up at
her home or her job.5 7 Even if the woman is successful in her
attempt to leave the battering relationship, she may find that the
violence does not end. Many women who do manage to leave
find that they are still harassed by the batterer for years after a
divorce or separation.5 8
48. Id. at 53.
49. Browne, supra note 14, at 9.
50. See generall, MARTIN, supra note 15; Browne, supra note 14, at 10-11.
51. Address by Angela Browne, Comparison of Victim's Reactions Across
Traumas, Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, Tucson, Arizona (Apr. 11,
1980) [copy on file in the offices of California Western law Review]; Eisenberg &
Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, 14 TRIAL 34, 36 (July 1978);
WALKER supra note 15.
52. See supra note 50.
53. Browne, supra note 14, at 10-11; MARTIN, supra note 15, at 76.
54. Browne, supra note 14, at 10.
55. A man who was eventually killed by his wife wrote, "'[every time, Karen
would have ugly bruises on her face and neck. She would cry and beg me for a
divorce, and I would tell her, I am sorry... I won't do it again. But as for the
divorce, absolutely not. If I can't have you for my wife you will die. No one else will
have you if you ever try to leave me."' Id
56. Id.
57. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 77-79. See also WALKER, supra note 15, at 51.
"Very few people understand this kind of fear. It is the fear of knowing someone is
searching for you and will beat you when he finds you. In the mind of someone who
has been badly beaten this fear blots out all reason. The man seems to be omnipo-
tent." MARTIN, supra note 15, at 78. One woman, charged with the death of her
husband, said, "'I knew if I ran he would find me. He tracked down his first wife
with only her social security number. Can you imagine what it would be like to go
through life, knowing that a man who intends to kill you may be just around the
corner?'" Browne, supra note 14, at 11.
58. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 77; State v. Coleman, No. A525094 (Super. Ct.
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 20 [2016], No. 3, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss3/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERA LAW REVIEW
Another obstacle which inhibits the battered woman's ability to
leave the relationship is that battered women often develop skills
of survival rather than escape.59 They focus upon what is ocur-
ring immediately, on what they need to do to make it through
today, rather than on making any long-term plans. 60 They de-
velop coping strategies based upon their evaluation of what
method of coping will subject them to the least amount of dan-
ger.61 Thus, the battered woman continues to live in an increas-
ingly violent relationship. 62 She knows what kind of injury her
batterer can inflict upon her. Consequently, she takes any threats
that he makes to her or others very seriously.6 3
A woman who is living in a violent relationship eventually finds
herself trapped in a situation which may make it difficult, if not
impossible, to leave.64 The woman may hope for a change in the
man.65 She will concentrate her efforts on trying to keep the envi-
ronment as stress free as possible so as not to cause him to become
upset.66 She is sure that if she only tries a little harder, things will
be better.67 What she learns is that no matter what she does, she
may still receive a beating.68 However, she continues to try to find
the one thing which will finally cause him not to beat her
anymore.69
Too often these relationships end only when one partner or an-
other is killed.70 When it is the battered woman who kills her
battering mate, she may be justified in asserting a plea of self-
defense. Because of the complexity of a violent relationship and
the effect the violence has on the woman's perceptions of danger,
it may be necessary to utilize expert witness testimony about the
battered woman syndrome to explain the woman's perceptions of
L.A. Cty., Cal. 1980) (murder charges dismissed); State v. Churchill, No. 104837
(Super. Ct. San Francisco Cty., Cal. 1981) (defendant acquitted of attempted murder);
State v. McEvoy, No. 107697 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Cty., Cal. 1982) (defendant
acquitted of attempted murder).
59. See supra note 51.
60. Browne, supra note 14, at 12.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 19.
63. Browne, supra note 14, at 29.
64. WALKER, supra note 15, at 174.
65. Id. at 67.
66. BWSS, supra note 15, at 109.
67. Id. at 93.
68. Id; WALKER, supra note 15, at 61-62.
69. BWSS, supra note 15, at 109.
70. Benke, Prosecuting Women Who Use Force in Seif-Defense, PEACE OFFICER
L. REP. 8 (1980); Caifornia Homicides (1971). In 1971, almost one-third of all the
female homicide victims were murdered by their own husbands; Kansas City Police
Report (1971). Forty percent of all homicides were a spouse killing a spouse; STAFF
REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF PREVENTION OF VIO-
LENCE, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 360 (1969).
[Vol. 20
7
Thyfault: Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial Comments
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
1984] BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
danger and the reasonableness of her response to those
perceptions.
II. THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND THE PLEA OF
SELF-DEFENSE
The traditional definition of self-defense 7 which involves the
concept of matching equal force with equal force does not allow
for the situation where the battered woman perceives her life to be
in danger.72 Because the battered woman's use of deadly force
may not have conformed to these traditional definitions, it was
often necessary to offer a defens- of insanity, or diminished ca-
pacity in an attempt to explain the woman's actions.73 These
71. Self-defense is a complete defense when "One who is not the aggressor in an
encounter is justified in using a reasonable amount of force against his adversary
when he reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily
harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of such force is necessary to avoid
danger." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 53 (1972).
72. In State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) the Washington
Supreme Court reversed the felony-murder and first degree assault convictions of the
female defendant and held that she was entitled to a self-defense jury instruction that
included the woman's perspective. The court concluded that:
The respondent was entitled to have the jury consider her actions in the light
of her own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which
were the product of our nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex dis-
crimination." [Until such time as the effects of that history are eradicated,
care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford women
the right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual handicaps
which are the product of sex discrimination. To fail to do so is to deny the
right of the individual woman involved to trial by the same rules which are
applicable to male defendants.
Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559.
73. Schnieder & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES I (E.
Bocnak ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as SCHNEIDER].
Sex bias permeates the legal doctrine regarding the perception of immi-
nent and lethal danger. The law assumes that both the attacker and the
victim have approximately equal capacities. While a man is assumed to
have the ability to perceive danger accurately and respond appropriately, a
woman is viewed as responding hysterically and inappropriately to physical
threat. However, certain factors relevant to women's experiences are not
taken into account. For example, women are less likely to have had training
or experience in hand-to-hand fighting. Socially imposed proscriptions in-
hibit their ability to fend off an attacker. The fact that women generally are
of slighter build also gives a male assailant an advantage. All of these con-
ditions will have an impact on the reasonableness of a woman's perception
of an imminent and lethal threat to her life such as would justify the use of
deadly force. These factors, however, have not usually been considered dur-
ing the trial. . ..
Even where the standard of self-defense is that of the person's own per-
ception of the circumstances, it is difficult to apply this standard to the wo-
man defendant. Not only are the circumstances under which women are
forced to defend themselves entirely different from those which cause men
to commit homicides, but the woman's state of mind is different as well.
Presenting the individual woman's perspective in trial means educating the
8
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choices forced the woman into a situation of having to face either
a prison sentence or commitment to a mental institution for the
act of defending herself.74
In light of recent research in the field of domestic violence, and
the subsequent influence on the law, an impaired mental state de-
fense should not be asserted without first considering the use of
self-defense as a justification for the homicide. 75 However, for
several reasons, it is often difficult for the courts and attorneys to
conceptualize how the self-defense plea can be asserted for the
battered woman.7 6 First, the battered woman may kill at a time
judge and jury about the incidence and severity of the problems of rape,
wife assault, and child abuse and molestation to the extent that they explain
the defendant's conduct. It also means educating them about the lack of
judicial and social alternatives available to women in these situations and
combatting specific myths, for example, that a woman who kills a man is
insane or that women enjoy rape.
Id at 18-20; See also Dvoskin, LegalAfternativesfor Battered Women W1ho Kill Their
Abuser, 3 THE BULL. OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 335
(1978).
74. [A] self-defense approach should be thoroughly explored as a first step
[when choosing a defense]. The traditional view of women who commit vio-
lent crimes is that their action was irrational or insane. Consequently, an
impaired mental state defense has often been relied on automatically. We
start from the premise that a woman who kills is no more "out of her mind"
than a man who kills. Our work has shown that the circumstances which
require a woman to commit homicide in these cases can demonstrate that
her act was reasonable and necessary. Accordingly, the homicide should be
defended as self-defense where possible, although an impaired mental state
defense may be appropriate in a given case.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 5.
This traditional view that women who commit violent crimes are insane is further
complicated because many of the survival behaviors a battered woman adopts often
leads to the woman being misdiagnosed as mentally ill. WALKER, supra note 15
writes: "Battered women's survival behaviors have often earned them the misdiagno-
sis of being crazy. Unusual actions which may help them to survive in the battering
relationship have been taken out of context by unenlightened medical and mental
health workers." Id at 21. Dr. Walker goes on to state that women have been hospi-
talized for schizophrenia, paranoia, and severe depression, as well as receiving elec-
troshock therapy and large doses of anti-psychotic medication by doctors who
respond to an overt symptom or symptoms of the battered woman, instead of under-
standing her actions in light of her family situation. Id.
75. SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 5.
76. Bochnak states that:
Defense attorneys often have conceptual difficulties with self-defense
cases involving female defendants. The events leading up to the homicide
do not fit the traditional male versus male self-defense model; in most cases
the defendant was armed and the aggressor was not. Many lawyers believe
that a defense of self-defense is precluded as a matter of law, whenever a
weapon is used in response to an unarmed attack, because they assume this
is not "equal force against equal, opposite force." This analysis ignores that
in most states a homicide is legally justifiable if it is committed by a person
who reasonably apprehends imminent grave danger to herself.
The defense of self-defense rests on the defendant's reasonable fear for
her life or of great bodily harm. In most women's self-defense, the defense
relies on the theory that a woman who is reasonably in fear for her life may
9
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which does not appear reasonable outside the context of the bat-
tering relationship.77 Second, there is a common misconception
that there is a separate defense known as "the battered woman
defense."'78 Finally, there is the misconception that the battered
woman syndrome is an impaired mental state defense,79 rather
than an explanation of the woman's reasonableness in believing
her life was in imminent danger.
A. When the Battered Woman Kills
The battered woman who acts in self-defense does so at a time
when she reasonably perceives her life to be in danger.80 In such a
situation her use of deadly force is justified.8' However, the situa-
tion during which a battered woman defends herself may not ap-
pear reasonable in a context outside of the battering
relationship.82 For example, a battered woman may kill the man
when he is lying down or is asleep.83 In these situations, the wo-
man is afraid that when the man gets up he will begin to batter her
again, probably because he has told her he would do so.84 She is
also afraid that if she trys to leave he will come after her.85 She
be forced to use a weapon to protect herself against a brutally assaultive, yet
unarmed attacker, who is superior to her in size or strength.
Bochnak, Case Preparation and Development, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES 43-
44 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Case Preparation].
77. See supra note 76.
78. WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES xvii (E. Bochnak 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Bochnak].
79. This argument was made by the state in Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801,
806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
80. [W]hen the defendant is a battered woman, the very intimacy of the
relationship explains the reasonablness of her perception of danger. The
battered woman learns to recognize the small signs that precede periods of
escalated violence. She learns to distinguish subtle changes in tone of voice,
facial expression, and levels of danger. She is in a position to know, perhaps
with greater certainty than someone attacked by a stranger, that the bat-
terer's threat is real and will be acted upon.
Case Preparation, supra note 76, at 44-45.
81. See supra note 76.
82. See supra note 76.
83. Colorado v. Robinson, No. C-7409 (District Court, Arapahoe Cty, Colo.,
1979). Defendant was charged with first degree murder after she shot her husband as
he slept in a sleeping bag in the front of the door. She entered a plea of voluntary
manslaughter and was placed on five years probation.
84. South Carolina v. Hutto, No. 78 GS101453 (Charleston County, S.C., 1979).
Defendant was charged with murder in the death of her husband. He had given her a
loaded shotgun, telling her that one of them was going to have to kill the other in
order to resolve their abusive situation. He told her that she should be gone when he
awoke, and then he went to the bedroom to go to sleep. Knowing that a beating was
imminent and that she had no place to go, she followed him and shot him. She was
acquitted on the charge of murder.
85. United States v. Player, Crim. No. 82-0422-01-N (S.D. Cal. 1982). Defend-
ant was charged with first degree murder after shooting her husband as he lay on a
10
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knows from past experiences with him what he will do to her if
she makes any attempt to leave or seek help.86 Thus, although she
may not be receiving an actual physical attack at the time, she
nevertheless believes that her life is in imminent danger.8 7
Another situation during which the battered woman uses
deadly force occurs during the tension building phase of the bat-
tering cycle,88 when the battering is not as severe as during the
acute phase.8 9 Once again, her past experiences with this man in-
fluence her perceptions of what is happening at that time.90 She
does not focus upon what is occurring at that moment, rather she
couch. He had severely beaten and raped her in front of her children a few minutes
earlier. He threatened to kill her and the children when he got up, and warned her
not to try to leave. The government argued that she could have walked out the door,
since she was not being physically attacked. A jury found Player guilty of second
degree murder and she was subsequently sentenced to three years in prison. This
sentence was later reduced and Player was released after serving ten months in fed-
eral custody.
86. Jones, author of WOMEN WHO KILL, related the following experiences of
many battered women who killed their husbands:
Homicide is a last resort, and it most often occurs when men simply will not
quit. As one woman testified at her murder trial, "It seemed like the more I
tried to get away, the harder he beat me." Gloria Timmons left her hus-
band, but he kept tracking her down, raping and beating her; finally when
he attacked her with a screwdriver, she shot him. Patricia Evans filed for
divorce, but her husband kept coming back to beat her with a dog-chain,
pistol-whip her, and shoot at her. At last, after she had been hospitalized
seven times, she shot him. Sharon Crigler evicted her live-in boyfriend, but
he insisted on getting back into the apartment, even when she threatened to
shoot. Jennifer Patri filed for divorce, but her husband kept coming back to
threaten her and to visit his daughters, at least one of whom he had sexually
molested. Ruth Childers was divorced and her husband had remarried, but
he would not stop arguing and threatening her about property. Bernadette
Powell was divorced, but her ex-husband decided to terrorize her one more
time. Janice Strand was forced to return to her husband when he threatened
her parents' lives. Patricia Gross's husband tracked her from Michigan to
Mississippi and threatened to kill her relatives there to force her to return to
him. Judy Austin's live-in boyfriend chased her from California to Arizona
to Wyoming. Kathy Thomas's boyfriend forced her to come home at gun-
point. Mary McGuire's husband, teaching submission, made her watch him
dig a grave, kill the family cat, and decapitate a pet horse. When she fled he
brought her back with a gun held to her child's head. Martha Hutchinson's
Klansman husband threatened to kill her if she left him, burned a cross on
her lawn when she did, chased her through the woods, shooting at her with a
pistol and a shotgun. Agnes Scott's husband found her and cut her up seven
years after she left him. There are cases on record of men still harassing and
beating their wives twenty-five years after the wives left them and tried to go
into hiding. If researchers were not quite so intent upon assigning the path-
ological behavior to the women, they might see that the more telling ques-
tion is not "Why do the women stay?" but "Why don't the men let them
go?"
A. JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL at 298-99 (1980).
87. See supra note 76.
88. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
89. WALKER, supra note 15, at 69-70.
90. See supra note 80.
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is fearful of the harm she knows he is capable of inflicting upon
her and she wants only to protect herself from that harm.9'
B. The Misconception of the Battered Woman Syndrome
Defense
A second source of confusion to courts and attorneys is that the
use of the battered woman syndrome to explain the reasonable-
ness of a woman's perception of imminent danger often results in
a misconception that there is a defense called the battered woman
syndrome. 92 Because battering, or a history of abuse alone, does
not justify a homicide, labeling the defense as the battered woman
defense leads to a mistaken belief that battered women have some
unique right to defend themselves. 93
The battered woman syndrome is not in or of itself a defense.94
The defense which is asserted is self-defense, not that the woman
was a battered woman.95 What must be proved is that at the time
of the incident, the woman reasonably perceived her life to be ininminent danger.96 Thus, while the history of abuse does not jus-
tify the use of deadly force, it does provide the woman with the
knowledge to reasonably perceive that she is in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm.97 As the court in Hawthorne v.
State98 correctly pointed out, testimony relating to the battered
woman syndrome is not offered to establish a novel defense,
rather, it is offered to assist a jury in assessing how the syndrome
related to the defendant's claim of self-defense. 99
91. WALKER, supra note 15, at 70. Walker reports that none of the women in-
volved in her first study of battered women who had killed their husband intended to
kill him, but rather they said they only wanted to stop him from hurting her.
92. Bochnak, supra note 78, at xvii; Case Preparation, supra note 76, at 42.
93. Since a history of abuse, isolated from other facts and circumstances,
does not justify homicide, the misconception that such a defense can be em-
ployed may result in conviction. Past abuse contributes only to the defend-
ant's state of mind at the time she killed her husband or lover, it does not
justify the killing.
The unique aspect of a battered woman's self-defense case is that the past
abuse provides her with the requisite knowledge to reasonably perceive the
deceased's behavior and capacity for violence as imminent and life threaten-
ing. The woman's prior experience with the deceased plays a major role in
case analysis and trial strategy. However, her defense is self-defense, not
that she suffered physical abuse. At trial, the defense attorney and the de-
fendant herself must convince the jury that her perceptions and actions at
the time of the homicide fulfilled the legal requirements of self-defense.
Case Preparation, supra note 76, at 42-43.
94. Id.
95. Id
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
99. Id. at 806.
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C The Misconception of the Battered Woman Syndrome as an
Impaired Mental State Defense
The third source of confusion to courts and many attorneys re-
garding the use of the battered woman syndrome is that the syn-
drome may be misperceived as an impaired mental state
defense. 1oo This situation can best be illustrated by the case of
Hawthorne v. State.'0'
At Hawthorne's second trial, the state had successfully argued
that the use of expert witness testimony about the battered woman
syndrome would violate two rules under Florida law. First, that
the criminal defendant could only offer testimony regarding her
mental state if she entered a plea of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, which Hawthorne had not done. Second, that Florida did
not recognize the defense of diminished capacity.' 0 2 The Florida
District Court of Appeals in overruling the trial court, correctly
recognized that the testimony of the expert, concerning the bat-
tered woman syndrome, was not being offered on the issue of the
defendant's mental state, such that she was not responsible for her
actions. Instead, the testimony was offered to show the reasona-
bleness of her perception that her life and the lives of her children
were in imminent danger at the time of the shooting. 03 As such,
the testimony would have aided the jury in interpreting the cir-
cumstances in which the defendant found herself and how these
circumstances affected the reasonableness of her belief.1°4
As is evident from the Hawthorne case, even though a court
may recognize the need for expert testimony in this context, the
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id
103. Id.
104. The court in Hawthorne stated:
We think there is a difference between offering expert testimony as to the
mental state of an accused in order to directly "explain and justify criminal
conduct,". . . and the purpose for which the expert testimony was offered
in the instant case. In this case, a defective mental state on the part of the
accused is not offered as a defense as such. Rather, the specific defense is
self-defense which requires a showing that the accused reasonably believed
it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent imminent death or great bod-
ily harm to herself or her children. The expert testimony would have been
offered in order to aid the jury in interpreting the surrounding circum-
stances as they affected the reasonableness of her belief. The factor upon
which the expert testimony would be offered was secondary to the defense
asserted. Appellant did not seek to show through the expert testimony that
the mental and physical mistreatment of her affected her mental state so that
she could not be responsible for her actions; rather the testimony would be
offered to show that because she suffered from the syndrome, it was reason-
able for her to have remained in the home and, at the pertinent time, to have
believed that her life and the lives of her children were in imminent danger.
Id. at 806-07.
[Vol. 20
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attorney who is proffering the testimony of an expert may still be
unable to have the testimony received into evidence. 10 5
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
When determining the admissibility of expert testimony, courts
will generally require that the testimony meet the three criteria set
forth in Dyas v. United States'0 6 or the criteria set forth by Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 10 7 The following discussion
will address the admissibility of expert witness testimony about
the battered woman syndrome under both Dyas and the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
A. Dyas v. United States
Under Dyas v. United States,0 8 before expert testimony can be
admitted, it is required that the testimony meet three basic crite-
ria.'0 9 These criteria are 1) that "the subject matter 'must be so
distinctively related to some science, profession, business or occu-
pation as to be beyond the ken of the average laymen' ";110 2) that
"expert testimony is [admissible only] if the state of the pertinent
art or scientific knowledge. . . permits a reasonable opinion to be
asserted by an expert";' 1 ' and 3) "the witness must have sufficient
skill, knowledge or experience in that field or calling as to make it
appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in
his search for truth." 1 2 Much of the litigation surrounding the
admissibility of the testimony about the battered woman syn-
drome has focused upon the first two criteria of the Dyas stan-
dards. 1 3 However, as will be developed below, the proper focus
105. On remand, the trial court determined that the expert would not be allowed
to testify. Order, supra note 8, at 2.
106. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
107. 28 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1984).
108. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
109. The following analysis of the three criteria for admitting expert testimony
under the test set forth in Dyas requires that the elements be addressed in a different
sequence than appears in the text of the decision.
110. Id. at 832.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. One federal district court has ruled that the expert testimony would be admis-
sible at the defendant's trial for first degree murder. United States v. Player, Crim
No. 82-0422-01-N (S.D. Cal. 1982). This ruling was made on September 20, 1982.
As stated by the court in Ibn-Tamas v. United States: "[The expert's] testimony
would have supplied an interpretation of the facts which differed from the ordinary
lay perception ('she could have gotten out, you know') advocated by the government.
The substantive element of the Dyas, supra, test--'beyond the ken of the average lay-
men'-is accordingly met here." Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35
(D.C. 1979). The case was then remanded to the trial court in order that the hearings
be held to determine if the second and third criteria of Dyas could be met. If they
1984]
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for the court's inquiry should be on the third prong of the Dyas
test.
could, then the trial court was to order a new trial. Id. at 640. For an analysis of this
case decision, see Note, Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony Relating to Sub-
le Matter of Battered Women Admissible on Issue of Self-Defense 11 SETON HALL
255 (1980).
On remand, after memoranda were submitted to the trial court addressing the sec-
ond and third criteria of Dyas, the trial court determined "that the defendant failed to
establish a general acceptance by the expert's colleagues of the methodology used in
the expert's study of 'battered woman.'" Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893,
894 (D.C. 1983). Thus, the testimony was excluded. On appeal this decision was
upheld. The court held "that the trial judge was not compelled, as a matter of law, to
admit the evidence. He had discretion whether to admit [the testimony]." Id. The
court concluded that it should not substitute its judgment for the discretionary judg-
ment of the trial judge. Id
In Hawthorne, the court found that: "Our determination that this expert testimony
would provide the jury with an interpretation of the facts not ordinarily available to
them is subject to the trial court determining that [the expert] is qualified and that the
subject is sufficiently developed and can support an expert opinion." Hawthorne v.
State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
The Georgia Supreme Court, in holding that the expert testimony should be admit-
ted, stated "that the expert's testimony explaining why a person suffering from bat-
tered woman's syndrome would not leave her mate, would not inform police or
friends, and would fear increased aggression against herself, would be such conclu-
sions that jurors could not ordinarily draw for themselves." Smith v. State, 247 Ga.
612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678-83 (1981). For analysis of the Smith case see Note, Admitting
Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 VASHBURN L.J. 689 (1982).
In People v. Adams, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 430 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (1981), the court
held that the defendant had failed to make an offer of proof at the trial court in order
to preserve this claim of error for review. The trial court had no information to assist
it in initially ascertaining the admissibility of the testimony. In addition, the trial
record contained no information which would have aided the appellate court in deter-
mining that the "personality" of the defendant was so material and relevant to her
defense the lack of an offer of proof would have been excused; In People v. White, 90
Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 478, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1980), the court held that the testi-
mony by an internist that he had "occasion to treat battered women" and could offer
an opinion as to whether "battered women" who tried to remain with their mates was
irrelevant and immaterial as to the credibility of the defendant's claim of self-defense.
The defendant had been permitted to testify as to the nature of her relationship with
the deceased. Therefore, it was the court's opinion that the doctor's testimony would
serve no useful purpose in assisting the jury in deciding what transpired at the time
the death occurred. In State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981), the court held
that "where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered wife syndrome,
and the defendant established her identity as a battered woman, expert evidence on
the battered wife syndrome must be admitted since it 'may have . . . a substantial
bearing on her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing, .. [and is] essen-
tial to her claim of self-defense.'" Id.
The court in State v. Baker, held that testimony regarding the battered woman
syndrome would be admissible to rebut the defendant's evidence of insanity. The
defendant was on trial for the attempted murder of his wife and had entered a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity. State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980).
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the use of expert testimony about the battered
woman syndrome holding that:
[e]xpert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" by a psychiatric social
worker to support defendant's claim of self-defense is inadmissible herein
because (1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant
acted in self-defense at the time of the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert
testimony is within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "battered wife syn-
15
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L Beyond the Ken the Average Juror.-The first prong of the
Dyas test requires that the subject matter be beyond the under-
standing of the average layperson. 1 4 The majority of the courts
which have ruled on the admissibility of battered woman expert
testimony have followed the landmark decision of Ibn-Tamas v.
United States,"5 which held that the subject matter of battered
woman was beyond the ken of the average juror.' 6
In Ibn-Tamas, the defendant, who was four months pregnant at
the time of the shooting, testified that on the day she shot her
husband, he had severely beaten her, threatened her with a gun,
and told her that he would get her out of the house one way or the
other.' 7 Further, she testified that this was only one of the many
episodes of violence which had occurred during their marriage." 8
The defendant testified that when she fired the gun at her hus-
band, she believed that he had a gun and was preparing to kill
her." 9 Because the deceased did not have a gun, the prosecution
argued that the defendant had lain in wait for her husband,
ambushed him on the stairs, and then shot him at point blank
range as he lay wounded on the floor.' 20
The defense argued that expert testimony relating to the bat-
tered woman syndrome was necessary to assist the jury in assess-
ing the credibility of the defendant's assertion that she perceived
drome" is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted sci-
entific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the guise of expertise; and (4)
its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that the defense should
have been able to "elicit testimony about the prior physical beatings the defendant
received in order that the jury [could] fully evaluate and consider her mental state at
the time of the commission of the offense." State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552, 555 (W.
Va. 1979).
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in rejecting the testimony of the expert psychologist
stated that "we are not saying that this type of expert testimony is not admissible; we
are merely holding that the state of the art was not adequately demonstrated to the
court, and because of inadequate foundation the proposed opinion would not aid the
jury." Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (vyo. 1981). It is interesting to note, that
the testimony of this same psychologist had been admitted in a murder trial in this
same county, where the defendant had asserted self-defense and was acquitted. Wyo-
ming v. Austin, No. 7828 (Natrona Cty., Wyo. 1979).
114. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977).
115. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
116. Id. at 630. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.
1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424
A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Dozier, 255 S.E.2d 552 (W. Va. 1979).
117. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 625, 630 (D.C. 1979).
118. Id. at 629.
119. Id.at 631.
120. Id. at 631.
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herself in imminent danger when she shot her husband.' 2' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that the
expert's testimony could serve two functions:
(1) it would have enhanced Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' general credibil-
ity in responding to cross-examination designed to show that
her testimony about the relationship with her husband was im-
plausible; and (2) it would have supported her testimony that
on the day of the shooting her husband's actions had provoked
a state of fear which led her to believe she was in imminent
danger. . . and thus responded in self-defense. 122
Therefore, the expert's testimony would have "supplied an inter-
pretation of the facts which differed from the ordinary lay percep-
tion . . . advocated by the government .. ,123 that she could
have gotten out of the relationship.
The Georgia Supreme Court reached a similar decision in
Smith v. State.124 The court held that the expert testimony should
have been admitted, in part because the defense involved was be-
yond the ken of the average lay person. The court then rejected
the trial court's finding that jurors could draw their own conclu-
sions as to whether the defendant acted in fear of her life. 125 This
line of reasoning was also adopted by the court in Hawthorne v.
State.126
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Thomas,127
upheld a trial court decision which had ruled expert testimony
was inadmissible on the battered woman syndrome.' 28 In
Thomas, the defendant suffered repeated episodes of physical
abuse from her common-law husband over a three year period.
Thomas testified that she had shot the deceased in self-defense
because she feared for her life. The defendant had picked up a
gun during a battering and as the deceased made a move towards
her, she shot him. Thomas testified that she knew that the dece-
dent would have taken the gun and killed her for having dared to
pick up the weapon. The defense attempted to call an expert wit-
ness on battered women to aid the jury in weighing the evidence
concerning the defendant's belief she was in imminent danger at
121. Brief for the Appellant at 4, Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.
1979).
122. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979).
123. Id. at 634-35.
124. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
125. Id at 619, 177 S.E.2d at 683; see also supra note 113.
126. Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also
supra note 113.
127. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981). See also supra
note 113; for an analysis of this decision, see Comment, State v. Thomas: The Final
Blow to Battered WomenZ 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 491 (1982).
128. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1981).
[Vol. 20
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the time of the shooting. The trial court refused to admit the testi-
mony and the defendant was convicted of murder. 29 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the State of Ohio reversed the convic-
tion. 30 The court held that it was error for the trial court to refuse
to admit, at the request of the defense, the expert witness testi-
mony on battered women.' 3' The case was then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Ohio which held that the trial court had not
made an error in disallowing the expert testimony. 32 The court
rejected the argument that the subject matter was beyond the ken
of the average juror. 33 It concluded that a jury is well able to
understand and determine if the defendant had a bonafide belief
that she needed to use deadly force in order to escape imminent
danger. In addition, the court concluded that an instruction given
to the jury was sufficient to enable them to adequately consider
the defendant's actions.' 34 The trial court had instructed the jury
to place themselves "in the position of the Defendant, Kathy
Thomas, with her characteristics, with her feelings . . . . '
However, such an instruction cannot be useful to a jury if they
have no understanding of the characteristics and feelings of the
battered woman. 36
The decisions admitting the testimony are correct when one
considers the myths which abound regarding the subject of do-
mestic violence.' 37 The expert testimony allows the jury to ex-
129. Id at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 138.
130. Id
131. Id.
132. Id at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
133. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
134. Id
135. Id at 520 n.2, 423 N.E.2d at 139 n.2.
136. A similar argument has been made in the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the New Jersey Coalition for Battered
Woman at 22, State v. Kelly, No. A-2256-80-T4, slip op. at 4 (N.J. App. Div., July 6,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief].
[S]ocial misconceptions concerning battered women which have been docu-
mented may well have prevented the jury from fairly considering her claim
of self-defense and viewing her actions as reasonable. Without expert testi-
mony, the jury had no basis to overcome these stereotypes and no context
within which to fairly consider the reasonableness of her beliefs and con-
duct, and evaluate her claim of self-defense.
137. [L]ay people do not generally understand the psychological dynamics of
the battering relationsip. [L]ay people have gross misperceptions with re-
gard to the nature of wife abuse and the conduct of abused women. A good
portion of the lay public labors under the misconception that abuse is a ran-
dom act of a mentally disturbed person. Another common misperception is
that abusive men are always mean and violent. Perhaps the grossest misun-
derstanding, found even among the most intelligent and sophisticated mem-
bers of the lay public, is that abused women can solve their problems by
simply leaving their battering husbands. The average lay person requires a
scientific explanation for why battered women would stay in a battering re-
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amine the defendant's actions in the context of a violent
relationship, unclouded by the juror's misconceptions which affect
their ability to judge the reasonableness of the defendant's use of
deadly force. 138
2. State oftheArt.-As previously indicated, most courts have
accepted the proposition that the subject of battered women is be-
yond the ken of the average juror.1 39 However, such rulings do
not insure that the expert will be able to testify. The second prong
of the Dyas140 test, which requires that the state of the art of the
subject matter be able to support an expert opinion, must also be
met.141 Thus, much of the litigation at the trial court level is cur-
rently focusing on whether the state of the art of the study of bat-
tered women can support an opinion by an expert. 142
In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 43 the court stated that "satisfac-
tion of the [state of the art] criterion begins-and ends-with a
determination of whether there is a general acceptance of a partic-
ular scientific methodology, not an acceptance, beyond that, of
particular study results based on that methodology."' 44 This
"general acceptance" standard was first set forth in Frye v. United
States, 45 where the court was ruling on the admissibility of the
results of a lie detector test. In disallowing the testimony, the Frye
court stated that "while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deducted from a well-recognized scientific prin-
ciple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
lationship. Without such an explanation, lay person [sic] inevitably misun-
dertand the nature of the battering.
Affidavit of Dr. Richard J Gelles at 3, United States v. Player, Crim No. 82-0422-01-N
(S.D. Cal. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Affidvi]. See also WALKER, supra note 15, at 18-
41.
138. After the defense strategy is chosen, myths and misconceptions which
would prevent the jury from seeing the defendant's acts as reasonable must
be identified. If the myths surrounding physical or sexual assault are openly
discussed and disputed in an evidentiary setting, homicide can be under-
stood as a response to a vicious physical assault. The jury will not consider
that the assault was "an enjoyable experience." Defense strategy can then
proceed as in any other criminal case.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 73, at 31-32.
139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
141. Id at 832.
142. United States v. Player, Crim. No. 82-0422-01-N (S.D. Cal. 1982) (testimony
admissible); Colorado v. Lewis, No. 81-Cr. 2377 (Denver County, Colo., 1982) (testi-
mony admissible); Colorado v. Bradley, No. C-6751 (Adams County, Colo., 1981)
(testimony admissible); Florida v. Hawthorne, No. 77-235-C (Escambia County, Fla.
1982) (testimony admissible); Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 136, at 7, New Jersey v.
Kelley A-2256-80-T4 (N.J. App. Div., July 6, 1982) (testimony inadmissible).
143. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
144. Id. at 638 (emphasis added).
145. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
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must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." 146
In Hawthorne v. State,147 the court applied the requirements of
Dyas and determined that expert testimony was beyond the ken of
the average layperson in that it would "provide the jury with an
interpretation of the facts not ordinarily available to them."' 48
However, the court concluded there had been no determination as
to the adequacy of the expert's qualifications or to the extent that
the methodology used by the expert was generally accepted.
Thus, there was no evidence indicating that the subject matter
could support a reasonable expert opinion. 149 The case was then
remanded for a new trial. 50
On remand, the trial court held a series of hearings to take testi-
mony and evidence to determine the adequacy of the psycholo-
gist's qualifications as an expert in the field of spousal abuse.15'
In addition, the hearings also considered the extent to which the
methodology used by the expert was generally accepted. 152 At the
end of the hearings, the trial judge concluded that "the depth of
study in this field [had] not yet reached the point where an expert
witness [could] give testimony with any degree of assurance that
the state of the art [would] support an expert opinion."153 Similar
hearings have been held in other courts where expert testimony
about battered women has been proffered.' 54
At issue in deciding whether the expert's methodology has
146. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
147. 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Cir. Ct. App. 1982).
148. Id. at 806.
149. Id.
150. Id at 807.
151. Order, supra note 8.
152. State v. Hawthorne, No. 77-235-C, slip op. at I (Fla. Cir. Ct. Escambia
County, Fla. 1982).
153. Id.
154. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 136, at 1-2. The trial court in State v. Kelly
conducted a lengthy examination of the defense's expert witness, focusing primarily
on the expert's scientific methodology. At the end of this hearing, the court ruled that
the testimony was inadmissible since the standard of self-defense in New Jersey pre-
cluded expert testimony as to defendant's state of mind. The trial court stated:
I will assume arguendo that she is eminently qualified as a psychologist, that
the state of the research and art of her profession is such that there, and I
would find that there is a battered wife syndrome, that this defense falls well
within the purview of the guidelines of that battered wife syndrome, that
that syndrome has been plausible and reasonably determined by reasonable
scientific efforts on her part, notwithstanding that she herself has had, she
being this witness has had what we might call in a quantitative sense a lim-
ited number of subject women that those tests are plausible, findings are
plausible.
That she would be appropriate to give testimony to a lay jury as to the
consequences of the syndrome, but that's not the bottom line. The bottom
line is, to put it vulgarly, so what? Because, under our law what can it go to
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gained general acceptance is the fact that within the study of do-
mestic violence a wide variety of research techniques have been
used.155 The theoretical orientation of the researcher will influ-
ence the methodology chosen to test a hypothesis, as well as the
conclusions that researcher will reach as to the characteristics and
causes of the battered woman syndrome.156 In addition, research-
ers may often comment upon and criticize the method used by
another researcher. 5 7 This may be done in an attempt to explain
why the particular research method they decide to use had been
chosen over another, 58 or the comment and criticism may be
given in an attempt to encourage methodological and theoretical
improvement within the field of family violence. 159 However, the
and that's what I want to ask you. What would the evidence go to? It does
not go to self-defense.
[RT 126]. This ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division. State v. Kelly, No.
A2256-80-T4, slip op. at 4 (N.J. App. Div., July 6, 1982). This decision was appealed
to the New Jersey Supreme Court. State v. Kelly, 91 N.J. 539, 453 A.2d 859 (1982).
On July 24, 1984, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that it was error for the trial
court to exclude the expert testimony since it was relevant to the defendant's state of
mind. In addition, the court concluded that since the testimony was central to the
defendant's claim of self-defense, its exclusion could not be harmless error. State v.
Kelly, A-99, Slip. Op. at 26-27 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) The court also concluded that the
testimony was relevant to explain why a woman would remain in a battering relation-
ship, and to dispell many of the common myths about battered women. Id. at 28-31.
155. For example, one researcher may use an extensive clinical interview of wo-
men who have identified themselves as battered women in order to study how bat-
tered women are similar to one another in their responses to the situation in which
they live. BWSS, supra note 15. Another researcher may use a clinical interview, but
in addition to interviewing battered women, a control group of non battered women
will also be studied. This method allows the researcher to determine how battered
women are similar to or different from other populations in the community. Address
by C. Washburn & I. Frieze, Methodological Issues in the Study of Battered Women,
Annual Research Conference of the Association for Women in Psychology (March
1980) [hereinafter cited as Washburn]. Other researchers have used a survey of per-
sons who have been randomly selected to participate in the survey. This method of
research is designed to assess the frequency and severity of battering in the general
population. STRAUS, supra note 15. Still others have developed a battered woman
profile through use of standardized psychological tests such as the Minnesota Multi-
phasic Personality Inventory. L. ROSEWATER, MMPI DATA (1981).
156. Psychiatry will study a model of pathology determined by the internal state
of the individual. Sociologists will focus upon the external factors relating to sociali-
zation, while the social learning theorists will look at how past learning experiences
impact upon present behaviors. A system theorist will attempt to study all variables
and then define the interrelationships of these variables. A. Lyon & H. Morrison,
Sef-Defense and Battered Spouse Syndrome: A Legal and Psychological Prospective 9
CRIM. DEF. 8 (1982).
157. Washburn, supra note 155, at 2. See also Affidavit, supra note 137, at 2.
158. In explaining why they chose one method over another, Washburn and
Frieze stated: "By using a control group [of battered and non battered women as
opposed to researchers who study only battered women], we were able to identify
battered women who had not necessarily sought help for marital problems." Wash-
burn, supra note 155, at 2.
159. As Richard Gelles, a sociologist who conducts research stated in his affidavit
in support of the admissibility of testimony regarding the syndrome in federal court:
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scientific comments and criticisms do not negate that researchers
employing different samples, sampling techniques, measurement
techniques, and research designs have identified similar patterns
which have become known as the battered woman syndrome.160
Because of the different methodologies which are applied, and
the comments and the criticisms about them, a court may decide
that the state of the art cannot support an expert opinion and thus
refuse to allow expert testimony.' 6' However, as was correctly
pointed out by the court in Zbn-Tamas, the Frye standard applies
to the "admissibility of expert witness testimony that is based on
new methods of scientiflc measurement."'162 In using the Frye stan-
dard to satisfy the "state of the art" criterion of Dyas, the inquiry
should be directed towards the general acceptance of a generic
category of scientific inquiry. 163 Thus, for purposes of determin-
ing the admissibility of the expert testimony about the battered
woman syndrome, the focus should not be placed upon whether
the concepts which the expert has derived from a particular
method have gained general acceptance, nor should it be upon
whether one researcher would have selected a different research
method than another. Rather, the focus should be on whether the
research methods used by the expert have received general accept-
ance in the scientific community. If the methods are acceptable,
[T]he state of the pertinent art, scientific knowledge, or specialized knowl-
edge in the field of family violence and specifically in the study of wife
abuse (or, the Battered Woman Syndrome) is sufficient to permit an expert
opinion. Although ... I have pointed out the major methodological and
theoretical problems with current research on family violence and wife bat-
tering, this has been done as a means of encouraging methodological and
theoretical improvement in the field. [T]he state of the pertinent art or sci-
entific knowledge is comparable, or more advanced, than other fields where
[expert testimony has been allowed].
Affidavit, supra note 137, at 2.
160. Id. at 3; It has been suggested that because a phenomenon such as wife beat-
ing is likely to have many causes, an adequate explanation will be based upon re-
search which utilizes a variety of perspectives and methods. Thus, while the results
may seem to be contradictory, more likely they are complimentary and interlocking
pieces of a larger picture. D. FINKELHOR, R. GELLES, G. HOTALING & M. STRAUS,
THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES-CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH at 29 (1983).
161. Order, supra note 8.
Expert social science testimony is unusual in the trial of a criminal case
where insanity is not the defense. Particularly when the expert witness is a
psychiatrist or psychologist, the prosecutor may invoke the holding in Frye
v. United States, that the standard for admissibility of scientific evidence "is
general acceptance" in the field, and argue that since there is no unanimity
in the scientific community about the causes and characteristics of domestic
violence, the testimony will not be reliable and is not admissible.
Steinberg, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battering, in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE
CASES 210, 213-14 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981).
162. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979) (emphasis added).
163. Id.
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the different conclusions, interpretations, and criticisms of that
method should go to the weight which the testimony is given and
not to its admissibility. 164
The second Dyas165 prong is satisfied by a determination as to
whether there is general acceptance of the expert's particular sci-
entific methodology. 66 An expert who has 1) received research
funding to study violent relationships; 2) published articles about
spousal abuse in professional journals; 3) has been invited to lec-
ture about domestic violence at professional meetings; or 4) has
attained some other form of professional recognition of his or her
work on the subject of domestic violence or violence against wo-
164. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 n.23 (D.C. 1979); MCCOR-
MICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as MCCORMICK].
As pointed out in the American Psychological Association Amicus Curiae Brief
submitted in support of the admissibility of the expert testimony in Hawthorne v.
State, No. AN-435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) at 18 [hereinafter cited as APA Brief],
the methods utilized by researchers in the field of domestic violence have
commonly been used by psychologists conducting research on any subject.
In addition, the underlying theories used by experts in this area are well
developed, well recognized theories that have been applied in other contexts
and adapted to the study of battered women. Furthermore, it is not neces-
sary that the expert's methodology be infallible or that it show unanimity of
expert opinion on the reliability of the expert's techniques.
Id. at 7.
One Commentator has stated:
Insofar as prima facie validation of a scientific principle is concerned, the
ordinary rules of expert testimony should not be viewed as affording carte
blanche for the introduction of every proposition which a purported expert
may see fit to enunciate. Thus, a ready and appropriate justification for the
exclusion of many unsupported and unsupportable propositions will be
available in the lack of qualification of the witness who asserts them. On the
other hand, if the witness is highly trained in a scientific area to which the
principle advanced may in theory be seen to relate, or if he is trained in the
methodology of science generally and can testify that he has experimented
extensively with the principle, he should be viewed as competent to testify as
to the validity of the principle and its applications. Viewing the qualifica-
tions of the witness, rather than some will-o-the-wisp consensus as the piv-
otal consideration, not only provides a test as to which the witness may more
meaningfully testify and the courts more easily apply, but will also afford
scope for evidentiary use of principles developed by the ever proliferating
researches of science in new areas.
J. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientif/c Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 14-15 (1970).
165. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 877 (D.C. 1977).
166. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979); In the APA Brief,
supra note 164, at 6-7, it was pointed out that the courts have relied on several guide-
lines in determining whether the relevant scientific community has generally accepted
the expert's methodology. These included 1) the number of cases in which similar
expert testimony was admitted; 2) scientific journals and other materials written by
authorities in the field; 3) the number of people involved in the field; 4) law review
commentary; 5) the number of scientific papers and articles written on the subject; 6)
any relevant legislation, and the use of the expert's methodology in others.
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men, should meet the general acceptance criteria for admissibility
of the expert's testimony about the battered woman syndrome.
3. Skill, Knowledge or Experience of the Expert Witness.-The
methods utilized by researchers in the field of domestic violence
have reached a point where the state of the art of the study of
violent relationships can support a reliable expert opinion. 167
This is apparent from the vast amount of legal, medical, psycho-
logical, and sociological literature which has recognized the syn-
drome. 68 So long as the expert's methods of research are
recognized by the research community, the important focus for
the courts should be on the third prong of the Dyas test 169 of ad-
missibility; the credentials of the expert who is to testify, and not
upon the individual methods used by an expert to study the bat-
tered woman syndrome. Factors to be considered in evaluating
the skill, knowledge, or experience of experts include the amount
of time the expert has worked in the field of domestic violence, the
recognition and the acceptance that the expert's work has received
from peers within the expert's professional community, and any
previous courtroom testimony the expert has given on the subject
of domestic violence.
If the credibility of the battered woman syndrome is to be main-
tained within the courts, the expert must be chosen because of
demonstrated experience in the field of domestic violence. The
expert must have a working knowledge of the battered woman
syndrome in order to determine if a defendant was a battered wo-
man, if her actions were done in self-defense, and finally, to testify
as to how being a battered woman impacted upon her perceptions
of imminent bodily harm or death. Allowing someone to testify
167. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
168. See generally E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR
(1974); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-
Defense 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 623 (1980); Walter, Expert Testimony and Battered
Women, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 167 (1982); Cross, The Expert as Educator: A Proposed
,4pproach to the Use of Battered Women Syndrome Expert Testimony, 35 VAND. L.
REv. 741 (1982); Note, Defense Strategiesfor Battered Women Who Assault Their
Mates: State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1981); Battered Women: Issues of
Public Policy, A Consultation Sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, Washington, D.C., January 30-31, 1978; P.E. McGrath, The Development and
Implementation of a Hospital Protocolfor the Identification and Treatment of Battered
Women, 5 Domestic Violence Monograph Series (November, 1980) (Department of
Health and Human Services); M.A. Schulman, A Survey of Spousal Violence Against
Women in Kentucky, Law Enforcement Assistant Administration Grant Number
2902-072-1/E2B/78, U.S. Dept. of Justice, July 1979; Under the Rule of Thumb - Bat-
tered Women and the Administration of Justice, A Report of the United States Civil
Rights Commission, January, 1982.
169. Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).
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who has had little or no working experience in this area may help
to persuade a court not to allow the jury to hear the testimony.
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
In contrast to the Dyas test discussed above, Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence170 requires only that the expert's scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge assist the trier of
fact. There is no requirement that the testimony be beyond the
ken of the jurors.17' In addition, it would appear that the "general
acceptance" test of Frye has been rejected by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Even before the rules were adopted, it was argued that general
scientific acceptance was not the proper criterion for admissibility
of scientific evidence.' 72 Neither Rule 702,173 nor the Advisory
Committee's Notes 174 make any mention of the Frye175 case or a
general scientific acceptance standard.176 Since the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, several federal courts have re-
jected the Frye standard.' 77 In addition, many states which have
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence have determined that the
general acceptance test imposes a standard for admissibility that is
inconsistent with the modem concepts of the Federal Rules of
170. "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
171. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 87-88, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hall,
297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 978-79 (La. 1979);
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 502-04 (Me. 1978).
172. "General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial
notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibiity of scientific
evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified ex-
pert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclu-
sion. . . . If the court uses this approach, instead of repeating a supposed
requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would ar-
rive at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific advantages.
MCCORMICK, supra note 1.64, at § 203.
173. 28 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1984).
174. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note. 28 U.S.C.A. § 702 (West 1984).
175. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
176. "Rule 702's failure to incorporate a general scientific acceptance standard,
and the Advisory Committee Note's failure to even mention the Frye case must be
considered significant. The silence of the Rule and its drafters should be regarded as
tantamount to an abandonment of the general acceptance standard." 3 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BURGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 702[03], at 702-16 (1981).
177. United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 2161 (1980), (court states that it had not adopted criterion of "generally accepted
explanatory theory"); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), (court
held that general acceptance test of Frye did not survive enactment of Federal Rules
of Evidence); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019 (1975) (better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as
other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination).
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Evidence.178
In Smith v. State,179 the defendant shot her live-in boyfriend
during a battering incident.180 The trial court had excluded expert
testimony about the battered woman syndrome on the basis that
the jurors were able to draw their own conclusions as to whether
the defendant acted out of fear.' 8 ' The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision.' 8 2 However, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed,
stating "that the expert's testimony explaining why a person suf-
fering from battered woman's syndrome would not leave her
mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear in-
creased aggression against herself, would be such conclusions that
jurors could not ordinarily draw for themselves."'' 8 3
In Smith, the Georgia Supreme Court held that expert opinion
about a battered woman was admissible, even as to the ultimate
issue, where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors could
not ordinarily draw for themselves.' 84 The court also emphasized
that "[t]his holding is in accordance with the modem view as ex-
emplified by Rules 702 and 704 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."' 8 5 Under the Federal Rules, a trial judge need only
determine if the proffered testimony is relevant and whether it
will assist the trier of fact.' 86 Any weaknesses in the testimony can
be brought out on cross-examination, with the trier of fact making
the ultimate determination as to the weight to be accorded to the
testimony.18 7 Utilizing this more liberal approach to admissibil-
ity, one federal court and several state courts, which have adopted
the Federal Rules of Evidence, have admitted into evidence testi-
mony regarding the battered woman syndrome.'88
Thus, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the courts will want
to evaluate the skill, knowledge, and experience of the expert by
utilizing the factors set forth above. As indicated earlier, it is im-
portant that the expert have demonstrated experience in the field
178. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612,277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d
80 (Iowa 1980).
179. Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 683.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975,
(La. 1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
187. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980).
188. United States v. Player, Crim. No. 82-0422-01-N (S.D. Cal. 1982); Smith v.
State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981);
State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980).
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of domestic violence and have a working knowledge of the bat-
tered woman syndrome in order that the credibility of the testi-
mony can be maintained with the courts.
CONCLUSION
When a battered woman kills her battering mate, the use of a
self-defense plea should be thoroughly explored as a defense,
along with the more traditional mental defenses. When women
have asserted self-defense, many courts have properly recognized
that in order for a jury to completely consider the reasonableness
of the woman's perceptions of imminent danger, expert testimony
about the battered woman syndrome is necessary. Utilizing a va-
riety of well respected research methodologies, psychology, sociol-
ogy, medicine, and the law have recognized the syndrome and the
effects it has on a woman's perceptions of danger to herself and
her family. With such wide recognition, it appears that the state
of the art of the study of battered woman can support an expert
opinion. Under both the Dyas criteria and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the courts should focus their inquiry into the admissi-
bility of testimony about the battered woman syndrome on the
experience and professional recognition that the individual expert
has achieved within the field of domestic violence.
Roberta K. Thyfault
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